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Le corse mondiali per proteggere i flussi petroliferi dopo che la guerra in Iran ha colpito le forniture #OilMarket #ecotrends https://flip.it/Jip_uv
Le corse mondiali per proteggere i flussi petroliferi dopo che la guerra in Iran ha colpito le forniture #OilMarket #ecotrends

https://flip.it/Jip_uv
Le azioni statunitensi rinunciano ai guadagni mentre il petrolio avanza: Riepilogo dei mercati #ecotrends https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-10/asian-stocks-poised-for-gains-oil-swings-higher-markets-wrap?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=bloomberg%2Fmagazine%2FEconomics
Le azioni statunitensi rinunciano ai guadagni mentre il petrolio avanza: Riepilogo dei mercati #ecotrends

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-10/asian-stocks-poised-for-gains-oil-swings-higher-markets-wrap?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=bloomberg%2Fmagazine%2FEconomics
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Iran sends millions of oil barrels to China through Strait of Hormuz even as war chokes the waterway #HormuzStrait #China #ecotrends https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/11/iran-ships-oil-china-strait-hormuz-closure-.html?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/israel
Iran sends millions of oil barrels to China through Strait of Hormuz even as war chokes the waterway #HormuzStrait #China #ecotrends

https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/11/iran-ships-oil-china-strait-hormuz-closure-.html?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/israel
Perché Vladimir Putin è il vincitore più grande della guerra in Iran #ecotrends #PutinTerms https://www.politico.eu/article/perche-vladimir-putin-e-il-vincitore-piu-grande-della-guerra-in-iran/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=other
Perché Vladimir Putin è il vincitore più grande della guerra in Iran #ecotrends #PutinTerms

https://www.politico.eu/article/perche-vladimir-putin-e-il-vincitore-piu-grande-della-guerra-in-iran/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=other
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#Punishments
#Punishments
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100 lessons from Quran100 Lessons from Quran! 1. Do not be rude in speech (3:159) 2. Restrain Anger (3:134) 3. Be good to others (4:36) 4. Do not be arrogant (7:13) 5. Forgive others for their mistakes (7:199) 6. Speak to people mildly (20:44) 7. Lower your voice (31:19) 8. Do not ridicule others (49:11) 9. Be dutiful to parents(17:23) 10. Do not say a word of disrespect to parents (17:23) 11. Do not enter parents’ private room without asking permission (24:58) 12. Write down the debt (2:282) 13. Do not follow anyone blindly (2:170) 14. Grant more time to repay if the debtor is in hard time (2:280) 15. Don’t consume interest (2:275) 16. Do not engage in bribery (2:188) 17. Do not break the promise (2:177) 18. Keep the trust (2:283) 19. Do not mix the truth with falsehood (2:42) 20. Judge with justice between people (4:58) 21. Stand out firmly for justice (4:135) 22. Wealth of the dead should be distributed among his family members (4:7) 23. Women also have the right for inheritance (4:7) 24. Do not devour the property of orphans (4:10) 25. Protect orphans (2:220) 26. Do not consume one another’s wealth unjustly (4:29) 27. Try for settlement between people (49:9) 28. Avoid suspicion (49:12) 29. Do not spy and backbite (2:283) 30. Do not spy or backbite (49:12) 31. Spend wealth in charity (57:7) 32. Encourage feeding poor (107:3) 33. Help those in need by finding them (2:273) 34. Do not spend money extravagantly (17:29) 35. Do not invalidate charity with reminders (2:264) 36. Honor guests (51:26) 37. Order righteousness to people only after practicing it yourself(2:44) 38. Do not commit abuse on the earth (2:60) 39. Do not prevent people from mosques (2:114) 40. Fight only with those who fight you (2:190) 41. Keep the etiquettes of war (2:191) 42. Do not turn back in battle (8:15) 43. No compulsion in religion (2:256) 44. Believe in all prophets (2:285) 45. Do not have sexual intercourse during menstrual period (2:222) 46. Breast feed your children for two complete years (2:233) 47. Do not even approach unlawful sexual intercourse (17:32) 48. Choose rulers by their merit (2:247) 49. Do not burden a person beyond his scope (2:286) 50. Do not become divided (3:103) 51. Think deeply about the wonders and creation of this universe (3:191) 52. Men and Women have equal rewards for their deeds (3:195) 53. Do not marry those in your blood relation (4:23) 54. Family should be led by men (4:34) 55. Do not be miserly (4:37) 56.Do not keep envy (4:54) 57. Do not kill each other (4:92) 58. Do not be an advocate for deceit (4:105) 59. Do not cooperate in sin and aggression (5:2) 60. Cooperate in righteousness (5:2) 61. ’Having majority’ is not a criterion of truth (6:116) 62. Be just (5:8) 63. Punish for crimes in an exemplary way (5:38) 64. Strive against sinful and unlawful acts (5:63) 65. Dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine are prohibited (5:3) 66. Avoid intoxicants and alcohol (5:90) 67. Do not gamble (5:90) 68. Do not insult others’ deities (6:108) 69. Don’t reduce weight or measure to cheat people (6:152) 70. Eat and Drink, But Be Not Excessive (7:31) 71. Wear good cloths during prayer times (7:31) 72. protect and help those who seek protection (9:6) 73. Keep Purity (9:108) 74. Never give up hope of Allah’s Mercy (12:87) 75. Allah will forgive those who have done wrong out of ignorance (16:119) 76. Invitation to God should be with wisdom and good instruction (16:125) 77. No one will bear others’ sins (17:15) 78. Do not kill your children for fear of poverty (17:31) 79. Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge (17:36) 80. Keep aloof from what is vain (23:3) 81. Do not enter others’ houses without seeking permission (24:27) 82. Allah will provide security for those who believe only in Allah (24:55) 83. Walk on earth in humility (25:63) 84. Do not neglect your portion of this world (28:77) 85. Invoke not any other god along with Allah (28:88) 86. Do not engage in homosexuality (29:29) 87. Enjoin right, forbid wrong (31:17) 88. Do not walk in insolence through the earth (31:18) 89. Women should not display their finery (33:33) 90. Allah forgives all sins (39:53) 91. Do not despair of the mercy of Allah (39:53) 92. Repel evil by good (41:34) 93. Decide on affairs by consultation (42:38) 94. Most noble of you is the most righteous (49:13) 95. No Monasticism in religion (57:27) 96. Those who have knowledge will be given a higher degree by Allah (58:11) 97. Treat non-Muslims in a kind and fair manner (60:8) 98. Save yourself from covetousness (64:16) 99. Seek forgiveness of Allah. He is Forgiving and Merciful (73:20) 100. Do not repel the petitioner/beggar (93:10)

100 lessons from Quran

100 Lessons from Quran!
1. Do not be rude in speech (3:159)
2. Restrain Anger (3:134)
3. Be good to others (4:36)
4. Do not be arrogant (7:13)
5. Forgive others for their mistakes (7:199)
6. Speak to people mildly (20:44)
7. Lower your voice (31:19)
8. Do not ridicule others (49:11)
9. Be dutiful to parents(17:23)
10. Do not say a word of disrespect to parents (17:23)
11. Do not enter parents’ private room without asking permission (24:58)
12. Write down the debt (2:282)
13. Do not follow anyone blindly (2:170)
14. Grant more time to repay if the debtor is in hard time (2:280)
15. Don’t consume interest (2:275)
16. Do not engage in bribery (2:188)
17. Do not break the promise (2:177)
18. Keep the trust (2:283)
19. Do not mix the truth with falsehood (2:42)
20. Judge with justice between people (4:58)
21. Stand out firmly for justice (4:135)
22. Wealth of the dead should be distributed among his family members (4:7)
23. Women also have the right for inheritance (4:7)
24. Do not devour the property of orphans (4:10)
25. Protect orphans (2:220)
26. Do not consume one another’s wealth unjustly (4:29)
27. Try for settlement between people (49:9)
28. Avoid suspicion (49:12)
29. Do not spy and backbite (2:283)
30. Do not spy or backbite (49:12)
31. Spend wealth in charity (57:7)
32. Encourage feeding poor (107:3)
33. Help those in need by finding them (2:273)
34. Do not spend money extravagantly (17:29)
35. Do not invalidate charity with reminders (2:264)
36. Honor guests (51:26)
37. Order righteousness to people only after practicing it yourself(2:44)
38. Do not commit abuse on the earth (2:60)
39. Do not prevent people from mosques (2:114)
40. Fight only with those who fight you (2:190)
41. Keep the etiquettes of war (2:191)
42. Do not turn back in battle (8:15)
43. No compulsion in religion (2:256)
44. Believe in all prophets (2:285)
45. Do not have sexual intercourse during menstrual period (2:222)
46. Breast feed your children for two complete years (2:233)
47. Do not even approach unlawful sexual intercourse (17:32)
48. Choose rulers by their merit (2:247)
49. Do not burden a person beyond his scope (2:286)
50. Do not become divided (3:103)
51. Think deeply about the wonders and creation of this universe (3:191)
52. Men and Women have equal rewards for their deeds (3:195)
53. Do not marry those in your blood relation (4:23)
54. Family should be led by men (4:34)
55. Do not be miserly (4:37)
56.Do not keep envy (4:54)
57. Do not kill each other (4:92)
58. Do not be an advocate for deceit (4:105)
59. Do not cooperate in sin and aggression (5:2)
60. Cooperate in righteousness (5:2)
61. ’Having majority’ is not a criterion of truth (6:116)
62. Be just (5:8)
63. Punish for crimes in an exemplary way (5:38)
64. Strive against sinful and unlawful acts (5:63)
65. Dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine are prohibited (5:3)
66. Avoid intoxicants and alcohol (5:90)
67. Do not gamble (5:90)
68. Do not insult others’ deities (6:108)
69. Don’t reduce weight or measure to cheat people (6:152)
70. Eat and Drink, But Be Not Excessive (7:31)
71. Wear good cloths during prayer times (7:31)
72. protect and help those who seek protection (9:6)
73. Keep Purity (9:108)
74. Never give up hope of Allah’s Mercy (12:87)
75. Allah will forgive those who have done wrong out of ignorance (16:119)
76. Invitation to God should be with wisdom and good instruction (16:125)
77. No one will bear others’ sins (17:15)
78. Do not kill your children for fear of poverty (17:31)
79. Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge (17:36)
80. Keep aloof from what is vain (23:3)
81. Do not enter others’ houses without seeking permission (24:27)
82. Allah will provide security for those who believe only in Allah (24:55)
83. Walk on earth in humility (25:63)
84. Do not neglect your portion of this world (28:77)
85. Invoke not any other god along with Allah (28:88)
86. Do not engage in homosexuality (29:29)
87. Enjoin right, forbid wrong (31:17)
88. Do not walk in insolence through the earth (31:18)
89. Women should not display their finery (33:33)
90. Allah forgives all sins (39:53)
91. Do not despair of the mercy of Allah (39:53)
92. Repel evil by good (41:34)
93. Decide on affairs by consultation (42:38)
94. Most noble of you is the most righteous (49:13)
95. No Monasticism in religion (57:27)
96. Those who have knowledge will be given a higher degree by Allah (58:11)
97. Treat non-Muslims in a kind and fair manner (60:8)
98. Save yourself from covetousness (64:16)
99. Seek forgiveness of Allah. He is Forgiving and Merciful (73:20)
100. Do not repel the petitioner/beggar (93:10)
Visualizza traduzione
New Supreme Leader#Iran’s New leader Iran’s Choice of New Leader Signals Defiance to Foes Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei could prove to be even more radical than his father and predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed by the U.S. and Israel at the start of the war. People gathered in Tehran on Monday, carrying flags and posters of Mojtaba Khamenei, to show support for Iran’s supreme leader.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times On its face, Iran’s choice of a new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, sent a message of continuity to a country battered by war. It was also a show of open defiance to Iran’s attackers. The United States and Israel killed the new leader’s father and predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in the opening salvos of their attack on Iran. They had openly warned Iran against replacing him with his 56-year-old son — a hard-line cleric seen as close to Iran’s top military force. The group of 88 clerics known as the Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei despite those threats. That choice risks prolonging the war and creating more uncertainty for the country, should he meet the same fate as his father. Iran was already deeply divided between those who support the clerical ruling system and those who oppose it. Choosing another hard-line leader may only deepen that divide. The decision is “laden with peril,” said Ali Vaez, a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group. Iran’s new supreme leader lost not only his father to U.S.-Israeli strikes, but also his mother, wife, and daughter, Mr. Vaez said. That means Iran is now “concentrating power in the hands of a man loathed by much of his own people and consumed by fury toward Israel and the United States.” President Trump called the younger Khamenei an “unacceptable” choice, and the Israeli military warned it would “continue to pursue every successor.” As a political figure, the younger Khamenei is a relative unknown, both to Iranians and the world. The older Khamenei was a known entity, unflinching in his resolve to crack down on internal dissent, as authorities killed thousands in protests in January, and insistent on the right to uranium enrichment as part of Iran’s nuclear program. Publicly, he ruled out actually building a nuclear bomb. Nevertheless, the concern that under his leadership, Iran could seek a nuclear weapon was held up as a reason for the United States and Israel to go to war. What is known about the new supreme leader is that he was influential behind the scenes while working in his father’s office, and is closely tied to Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Founded to defend the Islamic Republic that was established after Iran’s 1979 revolution, the Revolutionary Guards have not only become Iran’s most powerful military force, they wield considerable political and economic influence. Their leaders have directed the waves of retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel, Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, and U.S. bases and embassies in the region. The younger Khamenei was considered the preferred choice of the Revolutionary Guards for the supreme leader post. “It is definitely a consolidation and empowerment of the deep state in Iran,” said Abdolrasool Divsallar, an Iran expert at the Catholic University of Milan. Some experts worry the younger Khamenei could take the step that experts say his father never did, and race to build a nuclear bomb. “A war that was meant to prevent Iran from having a bomb could be the war that actually pushed Iran beyond the Rubicon to reach a bomb,” said Danny Citrinowicz, an analyst at the Atlantic Council, a think tank, and former head of the Iran branch of Israel’s military intelligence. Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT Iranian officials appear to be signaling that they are digging in for a longer fight. On Monday, the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, warned against more attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure and nuclear sites. “We know the U.S. is plotting against our oil and nuclear sites,” he wrote on social media. “And we, too, have many surprises in store.” Internally, some political analysts argue that Mr. Khamenei could be more pragmatic than expected. Hassan Ahmadian, a political analyst at the University of Tehran, said that Mr. Khamenei’s position of strength among hard-liners opens the possibility for him to seek consensus in a way that weaker candidates could not. “He could work with anyone and everyone within Iranian politics, based on the priorities he feels for Iran and for the country at this point,” he said. Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT ImageCrowds showing their support for Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on Monday.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times Some Iranians were hopeful that Mr. Khamenei would choose to play a role similar to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia — an authoritarian ruler who expanded social freedoms and rehabilitated the economy. Farhad, a logistics manager in Tehran, said many Iranians might welcome a heavy security state coupled with improved foreign relations, and a slow, gradual easing of social restrictions. Like many Iranians inside the country, he asked to be identified by his first name only for fear of retaliation. Across the country, government supporters have taken to the airwaves and rallied in the streets to pledge their allegiance to the new leader. Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT Mr. Khamenei’s rise may soon be seen as a predictable outcome the United States and Israel could have avoided, said Mr. Citrinowicz, the analyst. “Mojtaba is one example of really not thinking in depth how this war could develop,” he said. “Now, he will try to do his utmost to strengthen Iran’s position, and in that sense, maybe we were better off with the father.” Sanam Mahoozi and Kiana Hayeri contributed reporting. A correction was made on  March 9, 2026 :  An earlier version of this article misspelled the surname of an analyst at the Atlantic Council, a think tank, and former head of the Iran branch of Israel’s military intelligence. He is Danny Citrinowicz, not Citronowicz. When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at corrections@nytimes.com.Learn more A version of this article appears in print on March 10, 2026, Section A, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: Iran’s Supreme Leader Choice Signals Defiance, and Perhaps an Opportunity. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe See more on: Assembly of Experts, Ali Khamenei Read 341 comments Share full article 341 Related Content Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT Site Index Site Information Navigation © 2026 The New York Times Company NYTCo Contact Us Accessibility Work with us Advertise T Brand Studio Privacy Policy Cookie

New Supreme Leader

#Iran’s New leader

Iran’s Choice of New Leader Signals Defiance to Foes
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei could prove to be even more radical than his father and predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed by the U.S. and Israel at the start of the war.
People gathered in Tehran on Monday, carrying flags and posters of Mojtaba Khamenei, to show support for Iran’s supreme leader.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times
On its face, Iran’s choice of a new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, sent a message of continuity to a country battered by war. It was also a show of open defiance to Iran’s attackers.
The United States and Israel killed the new leader’s father and predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in the opening salvos of their attack on Iran. They had openly warned Iran against replacing him with his 56-year-old son — a hard-line cleric seen as close to Iran’s top military force.
The group of 88 clerics known as the Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei despite those threats. That choice risks prolonging the war and creating more uncertainty for the country, should he meet the same fate as his father.
Iran was already deeply divided between those who support the clerical ruling system and those who oppose it. Choosing another hard-line leader may only deepen that divide.
The decision is “laden with peril,” said Ali Vaez, a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group.
Iran’s new supreme leader lost not only his father to U.S.-Israeli strikes, but also his mother, wife, and daughter, Mr. Vaez said. That means Iran is now “concentrating power in the hands of a man loathed by much of his own people and consumed by fury toward Israel and the United States.”
President Trump called the younger Khamenei an “unacceptable” choice, and the Israeli military warned it would “continue to pursue every successor.”
As a political figure, the younger Khamenei is a relative unknown, both to Iranians and the world.
The older Khamenei was a known entity, unflinching in his resolve to crack down on internal dissent, as authorities killed thousands in protests in January, and insistent on the right to uranium enrichment as part of Iran’s nuclear program. Publicly, he ruled out actually building a nuclear bomb.
Nevertheless, the concern that under his leadership, Iran could seek a nuclear weapon was held up as a reason for the United States and Israel to go to war.
What is known about the new supreme leader is that he was influential behind the scenes while working in his father’s office, and is closely tied to Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Founded to defend the Islamic Republic that was established after Iran’s 1979 revolution, the Revolutionary Guards have not only become Iran’s most powerful military force, they wield considerable political and economic influence. Their leaders have directed the waves of retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel, Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, and U.S. bases and embassies in the region.
The younger Khamenei was considered the preferred choice of the Revolutionary Guards for the supreme leader post.
“It is definitely a consolidation and empowerment of the deep state in Iran,” said Abdolrasool Divsallar, an Iran expert at the Catholic University of Milan.
Some experts worry the younger Khamenei could take the step that experts say his father never did, and race to build a nuclear bomb.
“A war that was meant to prevent Iran from having a bomb could be the war that actually pushed Iran beyond the Rubicon to reach a bomb,” said Danny Citrinowicz, an analyst at the Atlantic Council, a think tank, and former head of the Iran branch of Israel’s military intelligence.
Advertisement
SKIP ADVERTISEMENT
Iranian officials appear to be signaling that they are digging in for a longer fight. On Monday, the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, warned against more attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure and nuclear sites.
“We know the U.S. is plotting against our oil and nuclear sites,” he wrote on social media. “And we, too, have many surprises in store.”
Internally, some political analysts argue that Mr. Khamenei could be more pragmatic than expected.
Hassan Ahmadian, a political analyst at the University of Tehran, said that Mr. Khamenei’s position of strength among hard-liners opens the possibility for him to seek consensus in a way that weaker candidates could not.
“He could work with anyone and everyone within Iranian politics, based on the priorities he feels for Iran and for the country at this point,” he said.
Advertisement
SKIP ADVERTISEMENT
ImageCrowds showing their support for Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on Monday.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times
Some Iranians were hopeful that Mr. Khamenei would choose to play a role similar to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia — an authoritarian ruler who expanded social freedoms and rehabilitated the economy.
Farhad, a logistics manager in Tehran, said many Iranians might welcome a heavy security state coupled with improved foreign relations, and a slow, gradual easing of social restrictions. Like many Iranians inside the country, he asked to be identified by his first name only for fear of retaliation.
Across the country, government supporters have taken to the airwaves and rallied in the streets to pledge their allegiance to the new leader.
Advertisement
SKIP ADVERTISEMENT
Mr. Khamenei’s rise may soon be seen as a predictable outcome the United States and Israel could have avoided, said Mr. Citrinowicz, the analyst.
“Mojtaba is one example of really not thinking in depth how this war could develop,” he said. “Now, he will try to do his utmost to strengthen Iran’s position, and in that sense, maybe we were better off with the father.”
Sanam Mahoozi and Kiana Hayeri contributed reporting.
A correction was made on 
March 9, 2026

An earlier version of this article misspelled the surname of an analyst at the Atlantic Council, a think tank, and former head of the Iran branch of Israel’s military intelligence. He is Danny Citrinowicz, not Citronowicz.
When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at corrections@nytimes.com.Learn more
A version of this article appears in print on March 10, 2026, Section A, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: Iran’s Supreme Leader Choice Signals Defiance, and Perhaps an Opportunity. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
See more on: Assembly of Experts, Ali Khamenei
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what neoconservative wanted????#IranIsraelConflict #neocons Neocons wanted an Azeri uprising against Iran. They didn't get it. So far Azerbaijan is de-escalating, along with other countries in Central Asia, including Turkey. Their interests aren't exactly in line with the DC think tank set. With Iran resisting the U.S./Israeli onslaught for the second week, what was supposed to be a quick transition to a pro-U.S. regime following the decapitation strike that killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is fast turning into a quagmire. While the U.S. and Israel continue to sow mayhem on Tehran from the skies, the previously unthinkable option of sending ground troops to Iran is gaining ground. First, an apparent plan was being hatched to employ Kurdish fighters to take on Tehran. Then, when drones, allegedly flying from Iran although Tehran denied it, struck the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan — hitting an airport terminal and a village school, and wounding four civilians — the stage appeared set for the opening of a northern front against Iran. Here was an alleged act of aggression from Iranian territory against Israel's closest partner in the South Caucasus. It offered the pretext to goad Azerbaijan into joining the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev called the drone attack "an act of terror.” In a combative speech, he vowed retaliation and called Iran’s Azerbaijanis (who constitute an estimated 20 million Iranians, or twice the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan) his “compatriots” for whom Baku provided a “beacon of hope.” He also declared that Tehran had deliberately “smeared” Baku in the eyes of Iranian Azerbaijanis by accusing it of permitting Israeli warplanes access to its airspace during Israel’s 12-day air campaign against Iran in June. All of that was music to the small but vocal group of neoconservative hawks perched at D.C. think-tanks, such as Hudson Institute’s Mike Doran, a former National Security Council official in the George W. Bush administration, and Brenda Shaffer who has performed undisclosed work for Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR. Shaffer has promoted Iran’s disintegration along ethnic lines in her work for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Doran and Shaffer appeared to be inciting Baku to join the fray against Tehran. Despite Aliyev’s tough rhetoric, however, the hawks must be disappointed by his response, which so far has been mainly symbolic. The Iranian ambassador was summoned to the foreign ministry and handed a protest note. In practical terms, vehicle border crossings with Iran have been suspended, a measure that has mostly affected Russian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian truck drivers transporting goods to and from Iran. Then on Sunday Aliyev spoke on the phone with his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian. According to the Azerbaijani read-out, Pezeshkian thanked Aliyev for personally visiting the Iranian embassy in Baku to express his condolences over Khamenei’s assassination and for pledging humanitarian support to Iran. He reiterated Iran’s official position that it was not involved in launching the drones towards Azerbaijan, echoing the official line of the Islamic Republic that blamed Israel for a “false flag” operation. Aliyev also conveyed his condolences to the Iranian people for the death and destruction they have experienced. Significantly, following the conversation, Aliyev ordered the reopening of the border; its closure lasted a total of only four days. The Nakhchevan airport resumed its operations. This de-escalatory impulse was reinforced by Baku's closest allies. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—which includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics—issued a joint statement in which they condemned the drone attacks "from the territory of Iran." Not "by Iran." That careful diplomatic wording reveals where Baku and its Turkic partners stand. They are showing solidarity and support for Baku while avoiding casting blame on Tehran and thus providing cover for Aliyev to pull back from escalation. This matters because the OTS countries are precisely the states that neoconservatives and Abraham Accords advocates have been busily courting. Their vision, promoted most actively by figures like Joseph Epstein from the Turan Research Center at the Washington-based Yorktown Institute, was always for an "alliance of moderate Muslim states” from the Gulf to the Caspian — a wall of secular Sunni-led countries allied with Israel against Iran. On the face of it, the return on that investment is looking meager. When push came to shove, these states are choosing diplomatic ambiguity over confrontation with Iran and a pro-Israel alignment. The much-hyped expansion to Central Asia of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, with Kazakhstan formally joining last year, appears to be producing more symbolism than substance too. Kazakhstan, an OTC member, condemned the drone attack (without attribution) in a separate statement, and called for a joint investigation by Azerbaijan and Iran. To understand Azerbaijan’s reluctance to join the war, one needs only look at the map — and Baku’s vulnerability becomes evident. Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure—the oil and gas platforms and pipelines that underpin the entire economy — sits within easy reach of Iranian drones and missiles. In particular, the Baku-Tbilisi (Georgia)-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline, known as BTC, has become the economic lifeblood of the Azerbaijani state — and a key source of oil for Israel. In early 2026, the share of Israeli oil imports from BTC reached 46%. According to Azerbaijan’s official media, up to 80% of the oil transported through this pipeline is of Azerbaijani origin. Disruption to its operation would severely damage the country’s economy. The Gulf states learned this lesson, which is why they have consistently chosen de-escalation with Tehran over confrontation. Azerbaijan is proving to be no different. Another reason for Aliyev’s caution is Turkey’s restraining role. While also targeted by Iranian missiles apparently designed to hit the giant Incirlik Air Base used by the U.S. military, Ankara’s worst nightmare is the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in western Iran which it would regard as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and security. Most critically, Iranian Azerbaijanis, much more numerous than those in the Republic of Azerbaijan, have shown no interest in seceding from Iran, much less in joining Baku in a “Greater Azerbaijan.” The majority appear to identify with Iran, with many playing key roles in Iranian governance: the slain Ayatollah Khamenei was ethnically Azeri, as is President Pezeshkian and countless other members of Tehran’s elites. Despite the efforts of exiled “South Azerbaijani” activists, pan-Turkist propaganda appears to have made only limited inroads among Iranian Azerbaijanis. None of this is to suggest that the hawks’ project to lure Azerbaijan into the war has run out of steam. If the war continues for weeks or months, as now seems likely, the “humanitarian aid” that Aliyev has professed to be willing to offer Iran could plausibly turn into “humanitarian intervention” to protect his ethnic kin, a possibility that Baku’s pro-regime commentators openly entertain. That could include encroaching deep into Iranian territory to create what the latter call a “buffer zone.” Pressure will also grow on Aliyev to reciprocate for Israel’s help in his war with Armenia in 2020. Turkey, which also supplied weaponry to Azerbaijan in that conflict, would likely be opposed, however. In any case, the best way to prevent the northward spread of a conflict that already involves in one way or another well over a dozen countries is to end the war as soon as possible and to stop listening to neoconservative hawks in Washington. A new report finds that lawmakers added nearly $34 billion to the Pentagon’s procurement and research accounts for FY2026, through 1,090 individual program increases, many of which the Defense Department did not even request funds for. Although individual program increases are not earmarks, they serve a similar function. Formal earmarks themselves were temporarily banned in 2011 to curb lawmaker-driven runaway spending, then reintroduced in 2021 by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) as “Community Project Funding,” and “Congressionally Directed Spending (CDS)” in the House and Senate respectively — and subject to transparency requirements, where lawmakers must associate themselves with the earmarks they propose. Top photo credit: U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and U.S. businessman Jared Kushner deliver a press conference upon the signing of the declaration on deploying post-ceasefire force in Ukraine during the so-called 'Coalition of the Willing' summit, at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, January 6, 2026. Ludovic Marin/Pool via REUTERS Is Ukraine peace toast, now that the Middle East is on fire? Jennifer Kavanagh March 08, 2026 Europe President Donald Trump came into office promising to end wars, but last week, he instead started a new one, when he ordered what the White House is calling a “proactive defensive” operation in response to Iran’s “imminent threat.” The onset of yet another U.S.-initiated conflict in the Middle East deals a double blow to Trump’s ambitions as a peacemaker. It has obviously derailed, perhaps permanently, the on-and-off talks between Tehran and Washington over the future of Iran’s nuclear program. But it is also likely to interfere with another Trump priority: ending the four-year-long war between Russia and Ukraine.

what neoconservative wanted????

#IranIsraelConflict #neocons

Neocons wanted an Azeri uprising against Iran. They didn't get it.
So far Azerbaijan is de-escalating, along with other countries in Central Asia, including Turkey. Their interests aren't exactly in line with the DC think tank set.
With Iran resisting the U.S./Israeli onslaught for the second week, what was supposed to be a quick transition to a pro-U.S. regime following the decapitation strike that killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is fast turning into a quagmire. While the U.S. and Israel continue to sow mayhem on Tehran from the skies, the previously unthinkable option of sending ground troops to Iran is gaining ground.
First, an apparent plan was being hatched to employ Kurdish fighters to take on Tehran. Then, when drones, allegedly flying from Iran although Tehran denied it, struck the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan — hitting an airport terminal and a village school, and wounding four civilians — the stage appeared set for the opening of a northern front against Iran. Here was an alleged act of aggression from Iranian territory against Israel's closest partner in the South Caucasus. It offered the pretext to goad Azerbaijan into joining the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran.
Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev called the drone attack "an act of terror.” In a combative speech, he vowed retaliation and called Iran’s Azerbaijanis (who constitute an estimated 20 million Iranians, or twice the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan) his “compatriots” for whom Baku provided a “beacon of hope.” He also declared that Tehran had deliberately “smeared” Baku in the eyes of Iranian Azerbaijanis by accusing it of permitting Israeli warplanes access to its airspace during Israel’s 12-day air campaign against Iran in June.
All of that was music to the small but vocal group of neoconservative hawks perched at D.C. think-tanks, such as Hudson Institute’s Mike Doran, a former National Security Council official in the George W. Bush administration, and Brenda Shaffer who has performed undisclosed work for Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR. Shaffer has promoted Iran’s disintegration along ethnic lines in her work for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Doran and Shaffer appeared to be inciting Baku to join the fray against Tehran.
Despite Aliyev’s tough rhetoric, however, the hawks must be disappointed by his response, which so far has been mainly symbolic. The Iranian ambassador was summoned to the foreign ministry and handed a protest note. In practical terms, vehicle border crossings with Iran have been suspended, a measure that has mostly affected Russian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian truck drivers transporting goods to and from Iran.
Then on Sunday Aliyev spoke on the phone with his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian. According to the Azerbaijani read-out, Pezeshkian thanked Aliyev for personally visiting the Iranian embassy in Baku to express his condolences over Khamenei’s assassination and for pledging humanitarian support to Iran. He reiterated Iran’s official position that it was not involved in launching the drones towards Azerbaijan, echoing the official line of the Islamic Republic that blamed Israel for a “false flag” operation.
Aliyev also conveyed his condolences to the Iranian people for the death and destruction they have experienced.
Significantly, following the conversation, Aliyev ordered the reopening of the border; its closure lasted a total of only four days. The Nakhchevan airport resumed its operations.
This de-escalatory impulse was reinforced by Baku's closest allies. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—which includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics—issued a joint statement in which they condemned the drone attacks "from the territory of Iran." Not "by Iran."
That careful diplomatic wording reveals where Baku and its Turkic partners stand. They are showing solidarity and support for Baku while avoiding casting blame on Tehran and thus providing cover for Aliyev to pull back from escalation.
This matters because the OTS countries are precisely the states that neoconservatives and Abraham Accords advocates have been busily courting. Their vision, promoted most actively by figures like Joseph Epstein from the Turan Research Center at the Washington-based Yorktown Institute, was always for an "alliance of moderate Muslim states” from the Gulf to the Caspian — a wall of secular Sunni-led countries allied with Israel against Iran.
On the face of it, the return on that investment is looking meager. When push came to shove, these states are choosing diplomatic ambiguity over confrontation with Iran and a pro-Israel alignment. The much-hyped expansion to Central Asia of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, with Kazakhstan formally joining last year, appears to be producing more symbolism than substance too. Kazakhstan, an OTC member, condemned the drone attack (without attribution) in a separate statement, and called for a joint investigation by Azerbaijan and Iran.
To understand Azerbaijan’s reluctance to join the war, one needs only look at the map — and Baku’s vulnerability becomes evident.
Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure—the oil and gas platforms and pipelines that underpin the entire economy — sits within easy reach of Iranian drones and missiles. In particular, the Baku-Tbilisi (Georgia)-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline, known as BTC, has become the economic lifeblood of the Azerbaijani state — and a key source of oil for Israel. In early 2026, the share of Israeli oil imports from BTC reached 46%.
According to Azerbaijan’s official media, up to 80% of the oil transported through this pipeline is of Azerbaijani origin. Disruption to its operation would severely damage the country’s economy. The Gulf states learned this lesson, which is why they have consistently chosen de-escalation with Tehran over confrontation. Azerbaijan is proving to be no different.
Another reason for Aliyev’s caution is Turkey’s restraining role. While also targeted by Iranian missiles apparently designed to hit the giant Incirlik Air Base used by the U.S. military, Ankara’s worst nightmare is the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in western Iran which it would regard as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and security.
Most critically, Iranian Azerbaijanis, much more numerous than those in the Republic of Azerbaijan, have shown no interest in seceding from Iran, much less in joining Baku in a “Greater Azerbaijan.” The majority appear to identify with Iran, with many playing key roles in Iranian governance: the slain Ayatollah Khamenei was ethnically Azeri, as is President Pezeshkian and countless other members of Tehran’s elites.
Despite the efforts of exiled “South Azerbaijani” activists, pan-Turkist propaganda appears to have made only limited inroads among Iranian Azerbaijanis.
None of this is to suggest that the hawks’ project to lure Azerbaijan into the war has run out of steam. If the war continues for weeks or months, as now seems likely, the “humanitarian aid” that Aliyev has professed to be willing to offer Iran could plausibly turn into “humanitarian intervention” to protect his ethnic kin, a possibility that Baku’s pro-regime commentators openly entertain. That could include encroaching deep into Iranian territory to create what the latter call a “buffer zone.”
Pressure will also grow on Aliyev to reciprocate for Israel’s help in his war with Armenia in 2020. Turkey, which also supplied weaponry to Azerbaijan in that conflict, would likely be opposed, however.
In any case, the best way to prevent the northward spread of a conflict that already involves in one way or another well over a dozen countries is to end the war as soon as possible and to stop listening to neoconservative hawks in Washington.
A new report finds that lawmakers added nearly $34 billion to the Pentagon’s procurement and research accounts for FY2026, through 1,090 individual program increases, many of which the Defense Department did not even request funds for.
Although individual program increases are not earmarks, they serve a similar function. Formal earmarks themselves were temporarily banned in 2011 to curb lawmaker-driven runaway spending, then reintroduced in 2021 by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) as “Community Project Funding,” and “Congressionally Directed Spending (CDS)” in the House and Senate respectively — and subject to transparency requirements, where lawmakers must associate themselves with the earmarks they propose.
Top photo credit: U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and U.S. businessman Jared Kushner deliver a press conference upon the signing of the declaration on deploying post-ceasefire force in Ukraine during the so-called 'Coalition of the Willing' summit, at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, January 6, 2026. Ludovic Marin/Pool via REUTERS
Is Ukraine peace toast, now that the Middle East is on fire?
Jennifer Kavanagh
March 08, 2026
Europe
President Donald Trump came into office promising to end wars, but last week, he instead started a new one, when he ordered what the White House is calling a “proactive defensive” operation in response to Iran’s “imminent threat.”
The onset of yet another U.S.-initiated conflict in the Middle East deals a double blow to Trump’s ambitions as a peacemaker. It has obviously derailed, perhaps permanently, the on-and-off talks between Tehran and Washington over the future of Iran’s nuclear program. But it is also likely to interfere with another Trump priority: ending the four-year-long war between Russia and Ukraine.
#OilPricesSlide #ecotrends $ A partire dal 10 marzo 2026, il sentimento economico globale è fortemente influenzato dal conflitto in Medio Oriente, causando un aumento dei prezzi del petrolio e minacciando di far salire l'inflazione. L'economia del Pakistan affronta una pressione significativa, con l'indice KSE-100 che ha subito una volatilità estrema (incluso un calo di quasi il 7% e successivi fermi nelle contrattazioni), mentre l'economia statunitense mostra resilienza nonostante l'inflazione ostinata e elevata. Notizie Economiche Globali & Locali (Marzo 2026): Impatto Geopolitico sui Mercati: La guerra in Medio Oriente ha scosso i mercati energetici, facendo aumentare i prezzi del petrolio e causando vendite in preda al panico sulla Borsa del Pakistan. Situazione Economica del Pakistan: Mercato Azionario: L'indice KSE-100 ha registrato un forte calo di quasi il 7% a causa dell'aumento delle tensioni in Medio Oriente, con le contrattazioni interrotte temporaneamente. Politica & Energia: La State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) mantiene il tasso di politica al 10,5%. Ci sono preoccupazioni riguardo ai costi più elevati per le importazioni di carburante che influenzano l'economia fragile. Sviluppo: Un progetto da Rs6,6 miliardi per 40.000 acri di frantoi di olive commerciali è pianificato, e il primo veicolo elettrico (EV) autoctono è previsto per le strade a meno di Rs1 milione. Tendenze Economiche Globali: Economia Statunitense: L'economia degli Stati Uniti si mantiene, con una crescita continua, sebbene lenta, e un mercato del lavoro stagnante. Settore Tecnologico: Crescono le preoccupazioni sulla redditività delle startup di intelligenza artificiale, con il ritmo di raccolta fondi di OpenAI in rallentamento. Commercio & Politica: Donald Trump sta spingendo per legami economici più stretti in America Latina per contrastare la Cina, mentre gli Stati Uniti stanno affrontando costi tariffari per $166 miliardi.
#OilPricesSlide #ecotrends $
A partire dal 10 marzo 2026, il sentimento economico globale è fortemente influenzato dal conflitto in Medio Oriente, causando un aumento dei prezzi del petrolio e minacciando di far salire l'inflazione. L'economia del Pakistan affronta una pressione significativa, con l'indice KSE-100 che ha subito una volatilità estrema (incluso un calo di quasi il 7% e successivi fermi nelle contrattazioni), mentre l'economia statunitense mostra resilienza nonostante l'inflazione ostinata e elevata.

Notizie Economiche Globali & Locali (Marzo 2026):
Impatto Geopolitico sui Mercati: La guerra in Medio Oriente ha scosso i mercati energetici, facendo aumentare i prezzi del petrolio e causando vendite in preda al panico sulla Borsa del Pakistan.

Situazione Economica del Pakistan:
Mercato Azionario: L'indice KSE-100 ha registrato un forte calo di quasi il 7% a causa dell'aumento delle tensioni in Medio Oriente, con le contrattazioni interrotte temporaneamente.
Politica & Energia: La State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) mantiene il tasso di politica al 10,5%. Ci sono preoccupazioni riguardo ai costi più elevati per le importazioni di carburante che influenzano l'economia fragile.

Sviluppo: Un progetto da Rs6,6 miliardi per 40.000 acri di frantoi di olive commerciali è pianificato, e il primo veicolo elettrico (EV) autoctono è previsto per le strade a meno di Rs1 milione.

Tendenze Economiche Globali:
Economia Statunitense: L'economia degli Stati Uniti si mantiene, con una crescita continua, sebbene lenta, e un mercato del lavoro stagnante.
Settore Tecnologico: Crescono le preoccupazioni sulla redditività delle startup di intelligenza artificiale, con il ritmo di raccolta fondi di OpenAI in rallentamento.
Commercio & Politica: Donald Trump sta spingendo per legami economici più stretti in America Latina per contrastare la Cina, mentre gli Stati Uniti stanno affrontando costi tariffari per $166 miliardi.
#TrumpSaysIranWarWillEndVerySoon I tagli dei tassi diventano sempre meno probabili man mano che le sfide globali, come le guerre in corso e le tensioni geopolitiche, si intensificano. Questo rende più difficile per i responsabili delle politiche, specialmente in Asia e in altre regioni, adattare la politica monetaria.   Le ripercussioni economiche di queste tensioni complicano le decisioni, con i funzionari che si concentrano sul mantenere la stabilità in mezzo all'incertezza.   La principale priorità per i responsabili delle politiche è affrontare queste sfide complesse e garantire la stabilità economica, piuttosto che perseguire tagli ai tassi in questo momento.   Data della notizia: Marzo 2026
#TrumpSaysIranWarWillEndVerySoon
I tagli dei tassi diventano sempre meno probabili man mano che le sfide globali, come le guerre in corso e le tensioni geopolitiche, si intensificano. Questo rende più difficile per i responsabili delle politiche, specialmente in Asia e in altre regioni, adattare la politica monetaria.
 
Le ripercussioni economiche di queste tensioni complicano le decisioni, con i funzionari che si concentrano sul mantenere la stabilità in mezzo all'incertezza.
 
La principale priorità per i responsabili delle politiche è affrontare queste sfide complesse e garantire la stabilità economica, piuttosto che perseguire tagli ai tassi in questo momento.
 
Data della notizia: Marzo 2026
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