[Rabbit] This is not a test of endurance between China and the United States, but a gamble on life.

The United States has now loosened the leash on Japan, its “bad dog.” Once the peace constitution is breached, Northeast Asia could be bitten back at any moment.

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In the past few decades, Japan has been firmly embedded in the U.S. East Asia security framework, not because its military strength is weak, but because the system chain known as the “peace constitution” has always restricted Japan's strategic autonomy. Japan can have a Self-Defense Force, cooperate with the U.S. military, and take on roles in bases and logistics, but fundamentally, it does not qualify to be a true military leader, let alone actively shape the regional security landscape.

Now, this red line is being gradually crossed.

From the legalization of the concept of “counterattack capability” to a significant increase in defense spending, to the public introduction and domestic deployment of long-range strike capabilities, Japan is rapidly aligning its institutional, weaponry, and strategic thinking with the military form of a “normal country.” The United States has not suppressed this but has instead backed it throughout in terms of diplomacy, public opinion, and technology.

The logic behind this is not complicated.

The biggest practical dilemma for the United States in the Western Pacific is limited resources. The European direction has long been constrained by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, while the security situation in the Middle East is repeatedly fluctuating. The U.S. can no longer maintain overwhelming presence in multiple directions as it did during the peak of the Cold War. To continue to pressure China in Northeast Asia, it can only shift more substantial risks onto its allies.

Japan is the most suitable one.

With a sufficiently forward geographical position, a complete industrial system, a mature military-industrial foundation, and a domestic political environment that has undergone significant changes under years of security anxiety narratives, Japan can upgrade from “helper” to “bearer” once it completes the final leap in constitutional and strategic cognition.

The problem lies precisely here.

Once Japan truly breaks free from the framework of the peace constitution, it will no longer just be a chess piece on the U.S. strategic chessboard, but will re-emerge as a country with independent security interests and regional influence aspirations. What the U.S. needs is a controllable forward pivot, but reality is likely to create a regional player with its own calculations.

The risks in Northeast Asia begin to spiral out of control from this point.

Japan has historically had an extremely strong anxiety about security and survival space. Once military normalization is fully realized, its strategic thinking will inevitably shift from “defensive cooperation” to “proactive shaping.” This does not mean that Japan will immediately initiate conflict, but it means that it will continuously escalate friction in areas such as intelligence, forward deployment, gray zone operations, and rules of maritime and aerial engagement.

These frictions are not occurring between the U.S. and Japan, but are happening in the surrounding seas and airspace of China.

The U.S. can retreat behind the scenes and outsource risks to its allies, but Japan must directly bear the military pressure, economic backlash, and social psychological impact brought by the confrontational front. Once the situation spirals out of control, the first to be drawn into high-intensity confrontation will not be the U.S. mainland, but the Japanese archipelago itself.

A more realistic problem is that Japan's military transformation will inevitably trigger a regional chain reaction.

South Korea has long been highly sensitive to Japan's military normalization. On one hand, it is highly dependent on the U.S. alliance; on the other hand, it remains vigilant on historical issues and current security judgments. The overflow of Japanese military power will force South Korea to further strengthen its own strike capabilities and forward deployments, shifting the Northeast Asia security structure from “U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation” to a more competitive trilateral game.

Russia in the Far East is also unlikely to remain indifferent. The leap in Japan's military capabilities will directly affect Russia's defense deployments and air-sea operational rhythm in the Far East, resulting in a continuous increase in the density of military interactions throughout Northeast Asia.

Once this high-frequency confrontation becomes normalized, the likelihood of accidental friction and misjudgment will rise rapidly.

This is precisely the essence of the “gamble on life.”

The U.S. bets that Japan can bear more risks without losing control; Japan bets that by adhering to the U.S. strategic framework, it can instead gain greater security guarantees and international status; while the regional countries that are forced to get involved face a constantly elevated security threshold.

For China, this game has never been just a test of endurance between China and the United States, but a deep reshaping surrounding the regional order structure.

If the U.S. successfully pushes Japan to the forefront, what China faces will not just be a military projection issue from the U.S., but a militarily complete neighbor in terms of institutions, industries, military-industrial capabilities, and geopolitical space. The strategic environment will shift from “external pressure” being dominant to a long-term coexistence with “close complex opponents.”

What is even more concerning is that the U.S. does not need this confrontation to truly escalate into war. As long as the state of tension continues to exist, Japan's defense spending will remain at a high level for a long time, and its military-industrial system will continue to expand, allowing the U.S. military-industrial sector and strategic influence to stabilize and profit from this.

Under this structure, what is truly under pressure is the overall economic security and development environment of Northeast Asia.

Capital is highly sensitive to geopolitical risks. High expectations for confrontation will long elevate regional financing costs, impact industrial chain layouts, and affect technological cooperation and personnel flow. On the surface, it appears to be a military security issue, but in essence, it is slowly eroding the growth space of the entire region.

Meanwhile, the direct costs borne by the United States are relatively limited.