Once I signed a small transaction to try a dApp, I did it on a laptop borrowed at the office because my personal machine was out of battery. A few minutes later my hot wallet got drained of some small tokens, not huge, but enough to wake me up. Since then I always assume the signing environment can be dirty.
I realized security in crypto often breaks because of habits and supporting infrastructure, not only because of bad code. Permissions are too broad, keys are stored in the wrong place, signing devices are not clean, each thing adds another crack. Many hacks I reviewed later started from leaked internal access.
It is like a SIM swap or a leaked OTP, the bank can follow the procedure, yet the user loses at the middle layer. In crypto, the middle layer is the signing machine, the update channel, and the operator.
When I look at Fabric Protocol I put the spotlight on the hardware supply chain and operations, because every system still depends on signing devices and servers. If firmware, patch distribution, and internal access are not tightly controlled, a smart contract audit only covers the surface. I want to see supplier controls, firmware verification, and traceable component provenance.
With Fabric Protocol, durable means upgrades do not create backdoors, staff changes do not drop keys, and small incidents do not become disasters. Durable also means leaving traces clear enough for investigation, and recovering through a rehearsed playbook.
I will examine how signing authority is separated, how multi signature rules are enforced, how devices are inventoried, and how logs are kept immutable. I also look at how keys are rotated, how suppliers are governed, and whether incident drills happen consistently each quarter.
I do not believe in absolute safety. I believe in rigor around hardware and operations, because risks tend to hide there over the long run.